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1Abstract
In this paper, an inﬁnitely-repeated Bertrand game is considered. The model has a two-tier
relationship; two ﬁrms make a self-enforced collusive agreement and each ﬁrm writes a law-enforced
contract to its privately-informed agent. The main ﬁnding is that in optimal collusion, interac-
tion between intra-ﬁrm (internal) contracting and inter-ﬁrm collusion may be exploited; inter-ﬁrm
collusion may enhance the eﬃciency of internal contract, and conversely, internal contracting may
facilitate collusion. Journal of Literature Classiﬁcation numbers: C73, L13, L14. Keywords:C o l -
lusion, internal contract, repeated games, market allocation.
21. Introduction
In this paper we explore a simple interaction between intra-ﬁrm (internal) contracting and inter-ﬁrm
collusion, considering an inﬁnitely-repeated Bertrand game. The model has two ﬁrms (principals),
where each ﬁrm has a single agent. The model thus has a two-tier relationship; each ﬁrm and its
agent write a single-period, law-enforced contract, and ﬁrms make a self-enforced agreement. In
each period, each agent privately observes its cost type. The cost type is high or low and i.i.d.
across agents and time. Each agent reports a cost type to its ﬁrm. The ﬁrm then makes cost
announcements to the rival ﬁrm, sets prices, and allocates the market in a state-dependent way.
In the model, ﬁrms and agents have the following incentive problems. First, the colluding
ﬁrms intend to communicate truthfully, so that production is carried out by the lowest-cost ﬁrm
(productive eﬃciency). Since each ﬁrm privately observes its agent’s report, a high-cost ﬁrm has
an incentive to understate the reported cost in the hope of increasing its market share. To elicit
truthful communications, ﬁrms may use a collusive scheme that promises the high-cost ﬁrm future
rewards (in the form of high continuation value) at the expense of the current-period proﬁta n d
promises the low-cost ﬁrm the current-period rewards at the expense of future proﬁt.1 Second, a
low-cost agent has an incentive to overstate the observed cost in the hope of receiving the greater
transfer payment (for a given level of production). To elicit truthful reports from agents, ﬁrms
may use a contract that grants information rents to the low-cost agent.
The main concern of this paper is to show that these contrasting incentives, observed in col-
lusion and contract, can work to the ﬁrms’ advantage.2 Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of collusion on
1This argument is adopted from Athey and Bagwell [4]. A related idea is found in Atkeson and Lucas [3], who
explore the eﬃcient allocation of consumption to many consumers, each of whom is subject to private taste shocks in
each period.
2The contrasting incentives between informed and uninformed parties diﬀer from the “countervailing incentives”
3internal contract. If the colluding ﬁrms coordinate to allocate the market by the criterion of pro-
ductive eﬃciency, then a low-cost agent who reports high costs will be paid nothing (because of
no production) when the other ﬁrm announces low cost. Collusion may thus soften the agent’s
incentive to overstate costs. In other words, given optimal collusion, it is less costly to induce
agents to be truthful in terms of information rents. Consider next the eﬀect of internal contract
on collusion. If a contract speciﬁes that an agent receives a large payment when the agent reports
high cost and the ﬁrm requests a large output, then a high-cost ﬁrm that understates costs may
suﬀer a large wage expense. Internal contracting may thus soften the ﬁrm’s incentive to understate
costs. In other words, given such a simple contract, it is less costly to facilitate ﬁrms’ truthful
communications in terms of future rewards.
This interaction between collusion and internal contract may be exploited if two conditions are
satisﬁed. First, the continuation value in the future must be large enough for the high-cost ﬁrm
to be truthful today. The current-period contracting relaxes, however, the rewarding constraint
imposed on continuation values (i.e., restriction on the equilibrium value set). Since the high-cost
ﬁrm suﬀers a large wage expense when it lies, the level of future rewards required for the ﬁrm to
be honest today can be reduced.3 Second, the internal contract must be enforceable. The contract
of this nature is contingent on the “hard-to-verify” information: a pair of the two-tier cost reports,
faced only by an informed party, as seen in Lewis and Sappington [15], Spiegel and Spulber [24] and others.
3The continuation values in the equilibrium payoﬀ play the role of side-payments in a legalized cartel. The
models with legalized cartel (e.g., Roberts [20], Cramton and Palfrey [6], and Kihlstrom and Vives [12]) show that
communication helps ﬁr m st oi d e n t i f yt h em o s te ﬃcient ﬁrm, and side-payments provide ﬁrms with truth-telling
incentives. Our analysis, in its relation to literature on repeated procurement auctions, may describe the case
in which (i) two collusive bidders play a knockout auction, prior to actual bidding, to ﬁnd who will be a lowest-cost
supplier (e.g., McAfee and McMillan [16]), and (ii) each bidder suﬀers some costs, were it to lie; thus the side-payments,
required for bidders to be honest, is reduced.
4made by each ﬁrm and its agent. An internal contract can be, however, easily enforced, if the
contract speciﬁes that a high-cost agent earns a large payment when the agent produces more than
a predetermined level of output, and if the compensations to agents take a linear form with the
level of output.
The equilibrium concept here is conﬁned to the class of perfect public equilibrium (PPE). As
in the public monitoring models, we ﬁnd the set of PPE values by using the recursive structure
explored by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1, 2]; after any history, the set of continuation values is
equal to the equilibrium value set of the repeated game. Our analysis of “asymmetric” strategies
(asymmetric PPE) builds on Athey and Bagwell [4]. As in their paper, if the high-cost ﬁrm gives
up producing today, then it is rewarded by a high continuation value, which is delivered through
market-share favors in the future. Athey and Bagwell characterize the optimal collusion that ob-
tains “ﬁrst-best” proﬁt, but do not treat the internal incentive problem. The distinct feature of our
analysis is that the interaction between collusion and internal contract is exploited; the optimal
inter-ﬁrm collusion enhances the eﬃciency of internal contract, and conversely, internal contracting
facilitates the optimal inter-ﬁrm collusion; for a wide range of parameters, the truthful communi-
cation between ﬁrms is elicited as internal contracting relaxes the restriction on the equilibrium
value set. The colluding ﬁrms with a simple internal contracting thus replicate the performance of
the ﬁrm under a binding inter-ﬁrm contract (e.g., a merging contract or a side-payment contract
in legalized cartels).
Our analysis of “symmetric” PPE is related to the work done by Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico
[5]. Considering collusion when a continuum of ﬁrm (cost) types is assumed, they focus on sym-
metric strategies where continuation valuesa r ea s s i g n e dt ot h e4 5d e g r e el i n eo nt h ep a y o ﬀ space.
This symmetrization imposes a restriction on the value set, and prohibits ﬁrms’ transfers in the
5form of continuation values, which might otherwise be facilitated by asymmetric plays; thus, it is
more costly to sort ﬁrms by their types. Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico ﬁnd that wasteful continu-
ation values (prices wars) are not used and price eﬃciency is achieved, but productive ineﬃciency
obtains. This paper ﬁnds, by contrast, that when two discrete ﬁrm types are assumed, produc-
tive eﬃciency (i.e., optimal collusion) can also be approximately achieved by symmetric strategies,
arguing that the negative eﬀect of the value set being restricted can be alleviated if each ﬁrm is
b o u n d e db yac o n t r a c tt h a tm a k e si tv e r yc o s t l yt ot e l lal i e .
The role of internal contracting, described in this paper, is related to the strategic eﬀect of
managerial incentive contracts, as seen in the existing literature.4 There is a broad analogy between
our analysis and the work done by Fershtman and Judd [7] or by Fershtman, Judd and Kalai [8].
They show that a ﬁrm may compete more eﬀectively in a Cournot oligopoly game, or collude more
eﬀectively with the other ﬁrm, if its manager enters this game and is bounded by a wage contract.
L i k e w i s e ,w eh e r es h o wt h a tﬁrms with internal incentive problem may collude more eﬀectively if
each ﬁrm is bounded by an internal contract that penalizes the ﬁrm were it to lie and increase its
market share.
Information in this paper is “soft”; it is subject to distortion when transferred. In this sense
this paper diﬀers from the existing “information sharing” literature, which studies the issue of
whether ﬁrms have incentives to share private information in an oligopolistic relationship but
ignores whether ﬁrms have the incentive to manipulate their private information.5 This paper
is rather close to Ziv [26], who shows that oligopolistic rivals may choose to exchange transfer
payments to induce the ﬁrm to announce cost type truthfully. Our analysis ﬁnds, however, a
4Fershtman and Judd [7], Fershtman, Judd and Kalai [8], Katz [11], Reitman [19], Sklivas [22] and Spagnolo
[23] study strategic wage schemes of game-playing agents in a static or repeated-game setting.
5See, for example, Gal-Or [10], Novshek and Sonnenschein [18], Shapiro [21], Vives [25] and others.
6truth-telling incentive mechanism without depending on direct transfer payments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 inves-
tigates the incentive constraints that strategies must satisfy, to be implementable as a equilibrium
play. Section 4 characterizes the self-enforcing collusive scheme by establishing the equilibrium
value set. Section 5 provides conclusions.
2. TheModel
We consider a Bertrand game in which two ﬁrms sell a homogeneous good. Each ﬁrm hires a single
agent, letting the agent produce the good. Whereas prices and quantities are publicly observed,
the realized unit costs are privately observed by the agent. In each period costs are independently
drawn from the identical common-knowledge distribution with discrete support {θL,θH}, where
θL <θ H. The probabilities of a ﬁrm drawing θL and θH are µ and 1−µ, respectively. For technical
simplicity, for now µ>1/2 is assumed. As for the market demand, a unit mass of consumers is
assumed to be homogeneous with valuation of the good ρ. It also is assumed that ρ>θ H, so that
a ﬁrm drawing θH has an incentive to increase its market share when price is ρ.
2.1. Benchmark: The Second-Best Contract
This subsection examines, as a benchmark, the behavior of a monopoly ﬁrm, which has two
privately-informed agents. When the ﬁrm wants to produce a quantity q, each agent i ∈ {1,2}
produces qi and q1 + q2 = q ≤ 1, where 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1. The associated notations, p and t, denote the
p r i c ea n dt h em o n e yt r a n s f e ra ﬀorded to the agent. The pair (θj,θk), indexed by (j,k), denotes
the state in which agent 1 reports θj and agent 2 reports θk. The state space is Ω ≡ Θ1×Θ2, where
Θi = {L,H} for i =1 ,2. The quantity that agent i produces in state (j,k) is denoted by qi
jk. Let
7µL ≡ µ and µH ≡ 1 − µ, and deﬁne ¯ q1
j ≡
P
k µk · q1
jk and ¯ q2
k ≡
P
j µj · q2
jk for j and k ∈ {L,H}.





















































and for agent 2.6 In this context the contract can be equivalently implemented in Bayesian or
in dominant strategy if the expected output is strictly decreasing in cost type (i.e., ¯ qi
L > ¯ qi
H),
this being satisﬁed in the solution.7 Hence, there is no loss of generality in looking for the optimal
contract within the set of dominant strategy implementation. As in the standard mechanism design
program, optimality implies that there are two binding constraints: the incentive constraint of the
“low-cost agent” (IC-A1
Lk and IC-A2
jL) and the participation constraint of the “high-cost agent”
(IR-A1
H and IR-A2
H). This paper considers the case in which the high-cost agent is willing to
participate in all states of nature. In this case the ex post participation constraints are binding;
i.e., t1
Hk−θHq1
Hk =0for k ∈ {L,H}.T h eﬁrm then oﬀers the following contract: If agent 1 reports
6This subsection assumes that no communication limit between principal and agent is present, and thus there is no
scope for a hierachical design for communication channels which deters the two agents from making a collusive
cost report. Laﬀont and Martimort [13], for example, study a hierachical design when there is a communication
limit between principal and agents.
7Mookherjee and Reichelstein [17] show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implemen-
tations holds if the agents’ cost functions satisfy a generalized single crossing property. This property is triv-
ially satisﬁed in the model having constant unit cost.






and if agent 1 reports low cost, the agent receives
t1
LL = θLq1
LL +( θH − θL)q1
HL or t1
LH = θLq1
LH +( θH − θL)q1
HH.
The terms (θH − θL)q1
HL and (θH − θL)q1
HH stand for information rents. The low-cost agent 1
thus earns the expected information rent (θH − θL)¯ q1
H. Likewise, the transfers to agent 2 can be
obtained.













jk) − Cj · q1









Note that letting a high-cost agent produce the good incurs the virtual cost CH >θ H, where CH
rises with the cost gap θH − θL and µ.8 In the optimum, production is carried out as follows: (i)
q1
LH = q2
HL =1 , (ii) q1
LL + q2





1 if ρ ≥ CH
0 if ρ<C H.
We here say that productive eﬃciency is achieved if production is assigned in this way.9 If ρ<C H,
the ﬁrm chooses not to produce the good in state (H,H) (i.e., qi
HH =0 ). This may occur when
θH−θL is large, and thus the ﬁrm would suﬀer large information rents if qi
HH > 0. Indeed, achieving




kk for k ∈ {L,H}.
9If r<C H, there is a time-inconsistency problem. The ex ante virtual cost in the ineﬃcient state is CH, but the ex
post cost is θH. In state (H,H), ex ante it is not proﬁtable to produce the good, but ex post it is. In this paper, only the
optimal (commitment) solution is considered.
9productive eﬃciency has a twofold beneﬁt. First, productions are carried out only by relatively
eﬃcient agents. Second, productive eﬃciency enhances the eﬃciency of contract; it is less costly
to sort out the low-cost agent, for a given level of production. For instance, in state (L,L), each
agent receives only
θLq1
LL +( θH − θL)q1
HL = θLq2













Lemma 1. The ﬁrm achieves the optimal per-period proﬁt:
ΠM =
(
ρ − E(θ) if ρ ≥ CH h
1 − (1 − µ)
2
i
(ρ − θL) if θH <ρ<C H,
if pjk = ρ for every state (j,k), and productive eﬃciency is achieved.
2.2. The Game
Consider ﬁrst the stage game in each period. The relationship between principal and agent lasts
for a single period; each ﬁrm renews the contract with its agent every period. It is assumed that
each agent is induced to report costs only by his or her own IC and IR constraints. The timing of
the game in each period is as follows:
1. Agent i privately learns type θi ∈ {L,H}.
2. Firm i writes its agent a single-period contract Mi.
3. The agent makes a report ri ∈ {L,H} to the ﬁrm.
4. The ﬁrm makes an announcement ai ∈ {L,H} to its rival ﬁrm.
5. The ﬁrm makes price and market share proposals, pi and qi.
106. The quantity of output is determined, and the money transfers (to agents) that have been
requested by Mi are implemented.
Each ﬁrm announces ai ∈ A ≡ {L,H}, based on its agent’s report ri.E a c hﬁrm then sets the







determine the market share of each ﬁrm i, which is denoted φi. If pi >ρ ,then φi =0 . If p1 = p2 ≤ ρ,
then φi =1 /2 if q1 + q2 6=1 , and φi = qi otherwise. Note that equally priced ﬁrms (p1 = p2 ≤ ρ)
can communicate each other to allocate market share in a state-dependent way. Market proposals
matter only if prices are equal, since market share φi would be determined by prices otherwise.
Consider the interim stage of the game, assuming that agents truthfully reported their cost
types (i.e., ri = θi). Each ﬁrm i has a ﬁnite inter-ﬁrm strategy set Si:
Si =
©








˜ qi | ˜ qi : Θi × A → <+
ª
,
where ˜ ai is the announcement function, ˜ pi is the pricing function, and ˜ qi is the market share
proposal function. The payoﬀ function is deﬁned as Πi : S → <, where S = S1 ×S2. As t r a t e g yo f







, ˜ p1 ¡
θ1,a 2¢
, ˜ q1 ¡
θ1,a 2¢ª
,
where a2 ∈ A. Deﬁne θ ≡ (θ1,θ2) and s(θ) ≡ (s1(θ1,a 2),s 2(θ2,a 1)). In each period each ﬁrm
actually receives πi(s,θ;Mi), which depends on the realizations of cost types. Since Πi is an





Consider next the repeated game. This paper restricts attention to perfect public equilibrium
(PPE), which requires that strategies be public: Firms’ choices at date t may be based on their
private information from date t, but only on mutually known information (realized choices) from
date t0 <t(Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin [9]). When each ﬁrm enters a period of play, it observes
11only the history of its own cost types and the associated choice functions. Thus, while each ﬁrm
observes the history of realized choices, it does not observe rival types or rival choice functions. Let
Ht be the set of public history up to period t, which is denoted ht = {at,pt,qt;Mt}. A strategy of
ﬁrm i in period t is denoted σi





t=1 is denoted σi.F o ra





where δ is common discount factor and where h1 = ∅.
As in the public monitoring models, we ﬁnd the set of PPE values by using the recursive
structure explored by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1, 2]; each ﬁrm’s PPE payoﬀ is factored into
two components, current-period proﬁt and discounted continuation values, and after any history,
the set of continuation values is equal to the equilibrium value set. The inter-ﬁrm analysis of this
paper builds on Athey and Bagwell [4]. Following their work, we exploit the analogy between
recursive structure of the repeated game and static mechanism design approaches, so that we ﬁnd
a mechanism that induces a truthful revelation in the two-tier relationship: internal contract and
inter-ﬁrm collusion. To detail this, suppose that price, market share and continuation value for ﬁrm
i in state (j,k) are denoted pi
jk,q i
jk and vi
jk, respectively. Let p, q and v be the associated vectors,
and let y ≡ (p,q,v) be the policy vector. In equilibrium, following the policy vector, each ﬁrm
truthfully announces the reported costs. To be implementable as an equilibrium play, the policy
vector must satisfy the following incentive constraints: (i) “on-schedule” incentive constraints (on-
IC), whereby each ﬁrm must truthfully announce its cost and be dissuaded from choosing the
policy assigned to a diﬀe r e n tc o s tt y p e( b e i n gt r u t h f u lw i t h i nthe equilibrium path), and (ii) “oﬀ-
schedule” incentive constraints (oﬀ-IC), whereby each ﬁrm must be deterred from choosing a price
and market share that is not assigned to any cost type (non-deviating from the equilibrium path).
Letting V be the set of equilibrium values, the design of an optimal collusion is then to ﬁnd a
12contract M =( M1,M2) such that (i) each agent is induced to be truthful, and (ii) there exists a
policy vector y =( p,q,v;M) that satisﬁes the on- and oﬀ-schedule incentive constraints of ﬁrms,
where continuation values (v1
jk,v2
jk) are drawn from V.
3. Incentive Constraints with Internal Contracting
In the optimal collusive scheme, ﬁrms set the prices p1 = p2 = ρ, and assign production eﬃciently.




. The transfer is a function of the
agent’s internal report (ri)a n dt h eﬁrms’ external announcements (a1 and a2), while market
allocations are contingent on ﬁrms’ announcements. It is assumed that the pair of transfers and
quantities schedules {ti(·),qi (·)} is publicly known by the two ﬁrms at the time of making their
choices of announcements, and that contracts cannot be secretly renegotiated, due to the high
transaction costs. The problem here is that since the schedules {ti(·),qi (·)} are contingent on
the two-tier reports, made by agents and ﬁrms, the contract is enforceable only in very stringent
conditions, as described in the following assumption. In later analysis, however, this assumption
will be relaxed.
Assumption 1. Agent i is able to verify the following information: (i) Whether its ﬁrm distorts
his reported information, (ii) the other ﬁrm’s announcement of costs, and (iii) ﬁrms’ price and
market share schedules in all states (j,k).
3.1. On-schedule Incentive Constraints
As was previously argued, we here consider a contract that supports the optimal collusion and
yet is extremely hard to enforce. In later analysis, we will show that the contract can be easily
modiﬁed to be an enforceable contract. Consider the following contract. When agent 1 reports




= θLq1 + RL, (3)
where RL ≡ (θH − θL)¯ q1
H is the expected information rent, which is required to dissuade the low-










θHq1 if q1 = q1
Hk
θHq1 + α · G1 if q1 = q1
Lk,
(4)





Lk − (pHk − θH)q1
Hk
¤
, which is the expected
current-period gain that ﬁrm 1 could have by understating its cost type. For ﬁrm 2, t2(q2;L)
and t2(q2;H) are analogously deﬁned. Thus, if ﬁrm i gains Gi by understating, it suﬀers an
extra expense α · Gi. The level of α hereafter acts as a contractual parameter. Our analysis here
abstracts from resorting to an immediate solution, α = ∞, in order to show that a contract of this
nature can be easily modiﬁed to a more realistic contract in later analysis. When in particular
the compensation to agents takes a linear form (with respect to quantities), ﬁrms can construct a
simple, enforceable contract, without causing any eﬃciency loss, for a wide range of parameters.









jk. If ﬁrm 1 announces cost type ˆ , given that its agent reports cost type j, then






pˆ k · q1





and ﬁrm 2’s current-period proﬁt is similarly expressed. The interim-stage proﬁto fﬁrm i is then
given by
Ui(ˆ ,j)=Πi(ˆ ,j)+δ¯ vi
ˆ .
14Thus the on-schedule incentive constraints of ﬁrm i are
Ui(H,H) ≥ Ui(L,H) (on-IC-Pi
H)
Ui(L,L) ≥ Ui(H,L). (on-IC-Pi
L)
The following lemma shows that under the contracts of costly distortion, ﬁrms are truthful when
expected output schedules are strictly monotone (i.e., ¯ qi
L > ¯ qi
H). When ﬁrms are truthful (ai = ri),
agents in turn are induced to be truthful (ri = θi) by the transfers in (3) and (4).
Lemma 2. When the downward on-schedule incentive constraints of ﬁrms (on-IC-Pi
H)a r eb i n d i n g
and ¯ qi
L > ¯ qi
H, the upward on-schedule incentive constraints of ﬁrms (on-IC-Pi
L) are slack, given
the contracts described by (3) and (4).10
Given the contracts, the high-cost ﬁrm i gains
Ui(H,H)=Πi(H,H)+δ¯ vi
H,
when it is truthful. When ﬁrm i understates, it earns
Ui(L,H)=Πi(H,H)+( 1− α)Gi + δ¯ vi
L,
after giving αGi to its agent. If the downward incentive constraint of a ﬁrm (on-IC-Pi
H)i sb i n d i n g ,
then
δ(¯ vi
H − ¯ vi
L)=( 1− α)Gi. (5)
The RHS of (5) represents the net current gain from understating. The equation describes the
relationship between the current gain from understating and the future reward in the form of
continuation values. It implies that a higher (discounted) continuation value must be attributed
10By focusing on the binding downward IC (on-IC-P
i
H), we will ﬁnd a minimum level of future rewards for the
high-cost ﬁrm to be honest today.
15to the high-cost ﬁrm for it to be honest today. When prices pi
jk = ρ, the RHS is
(1 − α)Gi =( 1− α)(ρ − θH)
¡
¯ qi




Note that given that productive eﬃciency is achieved, the current gains from understating rises
with ρ − θH.
If the downward IC of ﬁrm i (on-IC-Pi
H) is binding, the proﬁto ft h el o w - c o s tﬁrm in the interim
stage is then given by
Ui (L,L)=Ui(H,H)+( θH − θL)
¡
¯ qi
L − ¯ qi
H
¢
+ α(ρ − θH)
¡
¯ qi




The second term on the RHS of (7) is net information rents, after (θH − θL)¯ qi
H has been given
to the low-cost agent i. This rent for the agent is in part extracted as proﬁt when the market is
allocated in accordance with productive eﬃciency (i.e., when q1
HL = q2
LH =0 ). The last term
on the RHS reﬂects leakage from the (gross) current gain that the high-cost ﬁrm could accrue by
understating.
Lemma 3. If pi
jk = ρ, and if the downward IC of ﬁrm i (on-IC-Pi
H) is binding, then the ex ante
expected utility of ﬁrm i along the equilibrium path is
Ui =( ρ − θH)¯ qi
H + δ¯ vi
H + µ(θH − θL)
¡
¯ qi
L − ¯ qi
H
¢
+ αµ(ρ − θH)
¡
¯ qi




3.2. Oﬀ-Schedule Incentive Constraints
To implement the optimal collusion, ﬁrms must be deterred from charging a price not assigned to
any cost type. Following Athey and Bagwell [4], our analysis considers two types of oﬀ-schedule
deviations that ﬁrms can undertake: (i) a ﬁrm can slightly undercut the price and capture the
entire market after communicating with the other ﬁrm, and (ii) a ﬁrm can overstate or understate
16at the communication and then undercut the price.11







≥ ρ − θL − RL −
¡
ρq1




where v ≡ Πi
N/(1 − δ), w h i c hi st h ev a l u eo fi n ﬁnite repetition of a static Nash game.12 Likewise,
for ﬁrm 2, oﬀ-IC-P2












Consider next the second type of oﬀ- s c h e d u l ed e v i a t i o n s .T h el o w - c o s tﬁrm, for example, can
announce high cost at the communication and then slightly undercut price. Given the contract
in (3) and (4), however, this ﬁrm would gain nothing by overstating at the communication if it is
tempted to undercut price afterwards. The low-cost ﬁrm will be deterred from undertaking the
11A ﬁrm can deviate by increasing the market share above the proposed level while maintaining the collusive
price. This deviation can eﬀectively be replaced, however, by the deviation of undercutting the price slightly.


















(1 − µ)(θH − θL)
2
is optimal, since given the production schedule, it minimizes the expected transfers, as the contract in Benchmark does.
As for pricing, the high-cost ﬁrm sets the price equal to cost θH, having zero proﬁt. The low-cost ﬁrm uses a
mixed strategy, having the expected proﬁt:
(1 − µ)
·





(1 − µ)(θH − θL)
2
,
which is obtained by slightly undercutting the price of the high-cost ﬁrm. The ex ante expected proﬁti st h e n
Π
i
N = µ(1 − µ)(θH − θL)/2.









































An investigation shows that this second type of oﬀ-schedule is implied by oﬀ-IC-P1
jk.
Lemma 4. If pi
jk = ρ, then oﬀ-schedule incentive constraints boil down to oﬀ-IC-P1
jk.
4. Characterization of Perfect Public Equilibrium
In this section, we ﬁnd the contract (the level of α) that supports the self-generating set of optimal
PPE values along the equilibrium path, and ﬁnd a critical discount factor above which no ﬁrm





+ | ∃γ ∈ [0,1] such that
u1 = xα + γ (Xα − xα) and u2 = Xα − γ (Xα − xα)
ª
.
This segment corresponds to the contract that speciﬁes α, and has slope of −1 with two endpoints
(xα,X α) and (Xα,x α), where Xα >x α. We here establish Zα as a self-generating set of PPE










Assuming that any oﬀ-schedule deviation leads to permanent Nash reversions, then Zα ∪ UN is a












184.1. Contracting along the Equilibrium Path
In this subsection, we consider on-schedule incentive constraints, ignoring oﬀ-schedule incentive
constraints. Consider ﬁrst the case of ρ ≥ CH, in which q1
HH + q2
HH =1 . We here ﬁnd the level of
α under which yα ≡ (p,q,v;α) c a ne s t a b l i s ht h es e g m e n tZα. Every point in the set Zα has the
corresponding assignments of qi
LL and qi
HH.13 At an endpoint (xα,X α), for example, ﬁrm 1 receives
a small value xα, being assigned to a “disadvantaged” market shares such that q1
LL and q1
HH are
close or equal to zero. Attention is thus on how to induce ﬁrm 1 to be honest at the endpoint
(xα,X α) when in particular it draws high cost. Since the binding on-IC-Pi
H implies on-IC-Pi
L, we
focus on the binding on-IC-Pi




(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (9)
This equation describes the level of future rewards, required to dissuade ﬁrm 1 from producing
today when ﬁrm 2 announces high cost at the endpoint (xα,X α).14 It implies that the self-
generating segment must be suﬃciently long for the high-cost ﬁrm to be rewarded by a high
continuation value v1
HL within the self-generating segment; the value Xα must exceed xα by at
least the RHS of (9). Suppose that the notation d(yα;α) denotes Xα − xα when this diﬀerential
is induced by yα for a given α. Thus on-schedule incentive constraints imply that there is an
“additional” constraint:
d(yα;α) ≥
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (add-IC)
The LHS represents the diﬀerential Xα−xα, generated by yα, a n dt h eR H Ss t a n d sf o rt h er e q u i r e d
level of future rewards. The following Lemma shows that if α is greater than a certain level, then
there exists a policy vector yα that generates a suﬃciently long Zα. To gain some intuition, suppose
13Note that p
i





14Eq. (9) is derived in the Appendix.
19that the policy vector yα assigns q2
LL = q2
HH =1so as to establish the endpoint (xα,X α). If α is
larger, then a smaller future reward (RHS) is required, whereas a larger diﬀerential Xα−xα (LHS)
can be generated; if α is larger, utility for ﬁrm 2 can be signiﬁcantly increased by raising q2
LL or
q2
HH, but utility for ﬁrm 1 (xα) is smaller since future rewards to ﬁrm 1 in the form of continuation
value v1
HL is smaller.
If a policy vector yα provides truth-telling incentives at an endpoint (xα,X α), then we also
can ﬁnd an analogous policy vector y0
α that provides truth-telling incentives at the other endpoint
(Xα,x α). Then, the remainder of the segment can be constructed by a convex combination of two
policy vectors. The reason is that given the pricing schedule pi
jk = ρ, utilities and on-schedule
constraints are linear in market share and continuation values, for a given level of α. For here and
later use, deﬁne
α∗(δ) ≡
1 − δ + δ(2µ − 1)(1 − µλ)
1 − δ + δ2µ2 , (10)
where λ ≡ (θH − θL)/(ρ − θH).
Lemma 5. (i) For all {(δ,α):α ≥ α∗(δ)}, there exists a policy vector in which both on-IC-Pi
H
and add-IC are binding. (ii) For all {(δ,α):α∗(δ) <α<1}, there exists a policy vector in which
on-IC-Pi
H is binding and add-IC is slack.
Corollary 1. (i) The locus α = α∗ (δ) is downward-sloping, and (ii) the rise in λ shifts down the
locus.
An example of the locus α = α∗ (δ) is illustrated in Fig. 1. The locus a = α∗(δ) is downward-
sloping, since more patient ﬁrms are more willing to wait for the future rewards rather than capture
the current gains by understating. This locus also shifts down as λ rises for the following reasons.
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Figure 1: Loci α = α∗(δ) and β = β∗(δ).
future rewards are required to be large. On the other hand, when θH − θL is large, the rewarding
through market share favors is large; the ex ante expected utility can be signiﬁcantly increased by
raising market allocations (e.g., qi
LL =1 ). Thus, the rise in λ lowers the locus for a given δ.
Due to Lemma 5, we can immediately obtain the following result: For all {(δ,α):α ≥ α∗(δ)},
there exists a policy vector that satisﬁes all the on-schedule incentive constraints.
Lemma 6. Assume that ρ ≥ CH. If oﬀ-schedule incentive constraints are satisﬁed, then for all
{(δ,α):α ≥ α∗(δ)}, there exists a set Zα ⊂ UM such that Zα ∪ UN is a self-generating set of
PPE values.
Consider next the case of ρ<C H in which q1
HH + q2
HH =0 . When the cost gap is larger,
since future market share favor is more rewarding, ﬁrms are less tempted to understate costs. The








= θHqi + β (ρ − θH)qi, (12)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Given this contract, the ex ante expected utility of each ﬁrm along the equilibrium
path has the same form as in (8), where ¯ qi






(1 − β)(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (13)






2−µ+(3µ−2)δ if 0 ≤ δ ≤ ˆ δ
0 if ˆ δ<δ≤ 1,
(14)
where ˆ δ ≡ (2−µ)/[(2−µ)(1−µ)+µ2λ]. The following Corollary characterizes the locus β = β∗ (δ).
Corollary 2. (i) The locus β = β∗(δ) is decreasing in δ ∈ [0,ˆ δ]. (ii) The rise in λ lowers
β = β∗(δ) for δ ∈ (0,ˆ δ]. (iii) If λ is suﬃciently large such that λ ≥ (2 − µ)/µ, then for δ ∈ (ˆ δ,1],
β∗ (δ)=0 .
Al o c u sβ = β∗ (δ) is illustrated in Fig. 1. If λ ≥ (2 − µ)/µ, the high-cost ﬁrm can be induced
to be honest by a high continuation value within the self-generating segment, even if β =0 .
Lemma 7. Assume that ρ<C H. If oﬀ-schedule incentive constraints are satisﬁed, then for all
{(δ,β):β ≥ β∗(δ)}, then there exists a set Zβ ⊂ UM such that Zβ ∪ UN is a self-generating set
of PPE values.
4.2. Optimal PPE with “Hard-to-Enforce” Contracting
As of yet, our analysis has been conﬁned to the equilibrium path. In this subsection, we identify
ad i s c o u n tf a c t o ra b o v ew h i c hb o t ho n -a n do ﬀ-schedule incentives are satisﬁed. We ﬁrst consider
22the policy vector in which the constraint add-IC is binding, given the parameter range {(δ,α):
α = α∗ (δ)}. Lemma 5 implies that there exists a policy vector y∗ such that
d(y∗;α = α∗(δ)) =
(1 − α∗(δ))(ρ − θH)
δ
.
Let δ∗ and Z∗ denote the associated critical discount factor and self-generating segment, respec-
tively. To ﬁnd δ∗,i ts u ﬃces to check the oﬀ-schedule incentive constraint of a disadvantaged ﬁrm
at an endpoint of Z∗, since there the ﬁrm is more tempted to undercut the price than at any other
point of the segment. Consider, for example, oﬀ-schedule incentive constraints for ﬁrm 1. At the
endpoint, ﬁrm 1 is assigned to q1
LL = q1
HH =0by the policy vector y∗. In state (L,H), the ﬁrm
gains nothing if it undercuts the price; it is supposed to capture the entire market, following the
equilibrium path. In states (H,L) and (H,H), the current-period gains from a deviation are the
same: r − θH. But in state (H,L), the ﬁrm is less tempted to undercut the price, since it will be
rewarded by a high continuation value v1
HL for giving up producing today. Hence, oﬀ-schedule in-
centive constraints boil down to oﬀ-IC-Pi
LL and oﬀ-IC-Pi
HH. If critical discount factors, associated
with the two constraints, are denoted δ∗
LL and δ∗
HH, respectively, then δ∗ =m a x{δ∗
LL,δ ∗
HH}.T h e
following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1. Assume that ρ ≥ CH.T h e nf o r{(δ,α):δ ∈ (δ∗,1] and α = α∗(δ)}, there exists
as e tZ∗ ⊂ UM such that Z∗ ∪ UN is a self-generating set of PPE values.
Example. When ρ =4 , θH =2 , θL =1and µ =0 .6, then δ∗
LL ≈ 0.729 and δ∗
HH ≈ 0.678. The
critical discount factor δ∗ ≈ 0.729.T h u s ,f o rδ ∈ (0.729,1] and α =( 1− 0.86δ)/(1 − 0.28δ), there
exists a self-generating segment Z∗ in which u1 + u2 =2 .6/(1 − δ).
The result is analogous for ρ<C H. Interpretations of the ﬁndings are as follows. First, there
is an internal contract under which ﬁrms with δ>δ ∗ can replicate the performance of the ﬁrm
23under an inter-ﬁrm merging contract. In other words, there is an internal contract that can mimic
an inter-ﬁrm merging contract in terms of its performance. Second, moderately patient ﬁrms may
achieve the optimal merged proﬁt for a wide range of parameters. Even to moderately patient ﬁrms,
undertaking oﬀ-schedule deviations may not be proﬁtable, due to the twofold beneﬁt: productions
are carried out by relatively eﬃcient agents, and eﬃcient agents are sorted out in the least costly
way.
Until now our analysis has identiﬁed δ∗ that corresponds to the parameter range {(δ,α):α =
α∗(δ)}. Consider next the parameter range {(δ,α):α>α ∗(δ)}. In Lemma 5, it is shown that there
exists a policy vector yα in which d(yα;α)=( 1− α)(ρ − θH)/δ for a larger α;t h u s ,ﬁrms may
be able to establish a “shortened segment.”15 In particular, shortening the segment may relax the
oﬀ-schedule incentive constraint of the disadvantaged ﬁrm at an endpoint by softening the incentive
to undercut the price; thus some ﬁrms with δ<δ ∗ may be able to establish a self-generating set
Zα ⊂ UM. The following proposition shows that there is a boundary of (δ,α), above which ﬁrms
are able to achieve the optimal collusion.
Proposition 2. Assume that ρ ≥ CH. Then there exists a boundary {(δ,α):f(δ,α)=κ, where
κ ∈ <+} such that for {(δ,α):f(δ,α) ≥ κ}, there exists a set Zα ⊂ UM such that Zα ∪ UN is a
self-generating set of PPE values.
For ρ<C H, an analogous result is obtained. A boundary f(δ,α)=κ is depicted in Fig. 2.
Note that for δ ∈ [δ∗,1], the boundary is the locus α = α∗ (δ). The boundary cannot be upward-
sloping. The reason is that if for a given δ, the segment Zα could be established for α, then the
same segment Za c a nb ee s t a b l i s h e df o rα0 >α ; if a longer segment was constructed, the same







(, ) f δα κ =
Figure 2: A boundary f(δ,α)=κ.
longer segment can be constructed even if the required length is shorter.
4.3. Symmetric PPE with Enforceable Contracting
In this subsection, we will show that if α is suﬃciently large, then the Pareto-frontier value set
can be approximated by a “symmetric” PPE (SPPE), without depending on Assumption 1. SPPE
requires that ﬁrms’ strategies be symmetric. For example, in an optimal SPPE, pi





kk =1 /2. If ﬁrms’ strategies are symmetric, the equilibrium value set is
restricted to the 45 degree line on the payoﬀ space: {(u1,u 2):u1 = u2}. T h i sr e s t r i c t i o no nt h e
equilibrium set negatively aﬀects the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs, since it prohibits ﬁrms’ transfers in the form
of continuation values, which might otherwise be facilitated by asymmetric plays; thus, it is more
costly to sort ﬁrms by their cost types. This restriction, however, makes it easy for ﬁrms to write
25an enforceable contract. Further, even in the presence of this restriction, if α → 1, then SPPE











Depending on symmetric strategies, we here construct a self-generating set {(x,x),(X,X)}, where
X>x .
To construct the point (X,X), consider a symmetric policy vector y i nw h i c hp r i c ea n dp r o -
duction are assigned such that pi
jk = ρ, q1
LH = q2
HL =1 ,q i
LL =1 /2 and qi
HH =1 /2 − ε, and
continuation values are assigned such that vi
LH = vi
HL = vi
HH = X and
vi
LL = X −
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)(1 + 2(1 − µ)ε)
2δµ
= x. (15)
The number ε>0 can be arbitrarily small. The continuation value vi
LL is assigned to a lower value
x such that the downward incentive constraints (on-IC-Pi
H) are binding: A lower continuation
value vi
LL counters the ﬁrms’ incentive to understate costs today. An additional constraint (add-
I C )h e r ei st h a tt oe l i c i tt r u t h f u lc o m m u n i c a t i o na tt h ep o i n t(X,X),Xmust be greater than x by
(1 −α)(ρ−θH)(1 +2(1 −µ)ε)/µ(2δ). Given this policy vector, each ﬁrm can write an enforceable




= θLqi + RL,
where RL =( θH −θL)¯ qi
H =( 1−µ)(θH −θL)(1/2−ε), and if agent i reports high cost and produces






θHqi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1
2 − ε
θHqi + αGi if 1
2 − ε<q i ≤ 1,
where Gi =( ρ − θH)(¯ qi
L − ¯ qi
H)=( ρ − θH)(1/2+( 1− µ)ε). This contract can be enforced, since
the terms RL and Gi boil down to constants and the realized productions
¡
qi¢
are assumed to be
26veriﬁable.
To construct the other point (x,x), consider a policy vector y0 in which productive eﬃciency is
reduced such that q1
LH = q2
HL =1− ε, qi
LL =1 /2 − ε and qi
HH =1 /2 − 2ε, where 0 ≤ ε<1/2,
while the same continuation values and price are used as in y. Likewise, given this policy vector,





= θLqi + RL,







θHqi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1
2 − 2ε
θHqi + αGi if 1
2 − 2ε<q i ≤ 1,
where Gi =( ρ − θH)(1/2 − 2(2µ − 1)ε). The terms RL and Gi again boil down to constants. Let
this contract be denoted M0.
In this symmetric collusive scheme, ﬁrms are induced to be truthful as follows: If state (L,L) is
realized in the preceding period, each ﬁrm oﬀers the contract M0 and implements the policy vector
y0 by reducing productive eﬃciency, and otherwise, each ﬁrm oﬀers M and implements the policy
vector y. When in particular α is closer to 1, the two points (x,x) and (X,X) can be located
nearer, and production can be more eﬃciently assigned as ε is closer to 0. Letting δs denote the
critical discount factor, the result can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. Assume that ρ ≥ CH.I fα → 1, then the optimal SPPE can be approximated; for
all δ>δ s, there exists a set {(x,x),(X,X)}, such that {(x,x),(X,X)} ∪ UN is a self-generating
set of SPPE values, and X → ΠM/2(1 − δ) and X − x → 0.
This result is similarly obtained for ρ<C H. The results show that the negative eﬀect of
27symmetrization may be alleviated, if α is suﬃciently large. A formal proof for this result is
provided in the Appendix. This ﬁnding is related to the work by Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico
[5]. Considering collusion when a continuum of ﬁrms’ types is assumed, they characterize a SPPE
where equilibrium set is restricted to {(u1,u 2):u1 = u2}.16 They ﬁnd that wasteful continuation
values (prices wars) are not used and price eﬃciency is achieved, but productive ineﬃciency obtains.
This paper ﬁnds, by contrast, that productive eﬃciency can be approximately achieved in a SPPE
if each ﬁrm is bounded by a contract that makes it very costly to lie (to distort the reported
information). The reason is that in this discrete-type model, it is less costly to sort ﬁrms by their
types, since a ﬁrm suﬀers a larger expense when it tells a lie17
4.4. Asymmetric PPE with Enforceable Contracting
In this subsection, we will show that the Pareto-frontier value set can be achieved, without requiring
ﬁrms’ strategies to be symmetric and without depending on Assumption 1. Price and production
are thus eﬃciently assigned in this subsection. Consider the following contract oﬀered in the





(1 − µ)(θH − θL)
2
, (15)
where the last term of the RHS is the information rent that corresponds to qi
HH =1 /2. If agent i






θHqi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1
2






2 <q i ≤ 1.
(16)
16To be speciﬁc, the distribution over sellers’ types is log-concave.
17In this paper, the cost of sorting ﬁrms by their types is lowered by the presence of contract. In the context of price
discrimination, Lee [14] shows that if a continuum of consumer types is assumed, a ﬁr mm a yb ea b l et od i s c r i m i n a t e
consumers if and only if the ﬁrm has a mechanism that reduces the cost of sorting consumers by their types.
28The market share qi
HH here is ﬁxed at 1/2. Whereas ﬁrms are then less ﬂexible to provide market
share favors at state (H,H), a “favored” ﬁrm suﬀers lower information rents than it would when
qi
HH =1 . Given the contract, if ﬁrm i requests the high-cost agent to produce more than a ﬁxed
amount of quantity (i.e., 1/2), then it suﬀers an extra expense, α(ρ − θH)(qi − 1/2).
If ρ<C H, the contract deﬁned in (12) is enforceable without being modiﬁed. In other words, in
this parameter range Proposition 1 and 2 hold without depending on Assumption 1. The following
Proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 4. Assume that ρ ≥ CH and µ>1/3. For {(δ,α):δ ∈ (δ∗,1] and α = α∗(δ)},
where
α∗ (δ) ≡
1 − δ + δµ(1 − µλ)
1 − δ + δµ(1 + µ)
, (17)
there exists a set Z∗ ⊂ UM such that Z∗ ∪ UN is a self-generating set of PPE values.
Given the simple contract, the previous results that correspond to {(δ,α):α>α ∗(δ)} can be
immediately obtained. The result implies that ﬁrms with internal incentive problem may collude
eﬀectively, as opposed to the “non-agent” setting, as in Athey and Bagwell [4]. To characterize
“ﬁrst-best” collusion, Athey and Bagwell require λ, deﬁned as (θH − θL)/(ρ − θH), to be not too
small. We here show that if each ﬁrm is bounded by an internal contract that penalizes the ﬁrm
were it to lie and increase its market share, achieving the optimal collusion may not depend on
such a restriction on λ. Further, the internal contract may be simple and contingent on veriﬁable
information.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a new perspective on collusive conduct by examining a contrasting
29incentive problem that collusive ﬁrms may face, arguing that internal contracting may facilitate
inter-ﬁrm optimal collusion, whereas optimal collusion may lead to contractual eﬃciency. As
an extension of the model, we may consider a ﬁrm (headquarters) oﬀering a contract to two
agents (or two divisions) who privately observe proﬁtability of their own investment opportunities.
Assuming that this ﬁrm has a budget constraint, it has to approve a large budget to only one
project in each period. A speculative ﬁnding would be that a simple contracting may facilitate
divisions’ coordination (i.e., collusion), so that divisions communicate each other and then report
headquarters which division will receive a large-budget projects in each period, whereas collusion
(e.g., inter-divisional asymmetric plays) may enhance the eﬃciency of contract. In this way, the
relationship between contracting and collusion, facilitated by repeated interactions, awaits further
research.
Appendix
On-schedule Incentive Constraints. Given the contract deﬁn e di n( 3 )a n d( 4 )i nt h et e x t ,i f
pi
jk = ρ, then the interim stage proﬁts of ﬁrm i are
Ui(H,H)=( ρ − θH)¯ qi
H + δ¯ vi
H
Ui(L,H)=( ρ − θH)¯ qi
L − αGi + δ¯ vi
L
Ui(L,L)=( ρ − θL)¯ qi
L − (θH − θL)¯ qi
H + δ¯ vi
L
Ui(H,L)=( ρ − θL)¯ qi
H − (θH − θL)¯ qi
H + δ¯ vi
H.
When incentive constraints are downwardly binding, then
δ(¯ vi
H − δ¯ vi
L)=( 1− α)(ρ − θH)(¯ qi
L − ¯ qi
H). (A1)
































(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. ¥





















From these equations, we obtain
U1(L,L)=U1(H,H)+( θH − θL)
¡
¯ q1















Hk + δ¯ v1
H.
Hence, for α ∈ [0,1],
U1(L,L) − U1(H,L)=( θH − θL)
¡
¯ q1
L − ¯ q1
H
¢
+ αG1 > 0.
Similarly, the equation holds for ﬁrm 2. ¥
31P r o o fo fL e m m a5 .(i) To construct an endpoint (xα,X α), consider a policy vector:
yα ≡

     














LH =0 ) ,
v1
LH = v1






α =1 . Assume that the downward on-schedule incentive constraints (on-IC-Pi
H)a r e




[(ρ − θH)[1− µ + µα(2µ − 1)]q1
α +( θH − θL)µ(2µ − 1)q1
α (A5)




[(ρ − θH)[1− µ + µα(2µ − 1)]q2
α +( θH − θL)µ(2µ − 1)q2
α (A6)
+( ρ − θH)µ(1 − µ)α +( θH − θL)µ(1 − µ)].
Note that xa + Xa =
r−E(θ)
1−δ for all α. The constraint add-IC is binding,
d(yα;α)=
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
, (A7)











2(1 − µ)+2 µ(2µ − 1)(α + λ)
, (A8)
where λ = θH−θL
ρ−θH . If we ﬁnd the diﬀerential Xα −xα from (A5) and (A6) and plug it into (A7), we
obtain (A8). The lowest level of α at which (A7) holds is then given by
α∗(δ) ≡
1 − δ + δ(2µ − 1)(1 − µλ)
1 − δ + δ2µ2 . (A9)
Hence, for {(δ,α):α ≥ α∗(δ)}, there exists a policy vector yα in which the constraint add-IC is
binding. This is immediate from (A8). For a given δ,
(a) if α = α∗(δ), then q1
α =0(i.e., q2
LL = q2
HH =1 ) ,
















Since the continuation values, v1
HL and v1
LL, are not speciﬁed in the policy vector, we need to
show that given the policy vector yα,v 1
HL and v1
LL are drawn from the self-generating segment:
xα ≤ v1
HL ≤ Xα and xα ≤ v1
LL ≤ Xα.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst the value v1
HL. Given the policy vector yα,
adding the binding on-schedule incentive constraints of both ﬁrms obtains
v1
HL = xα +




α is chosen as in (A8), the constraint add-IC is binding:
Xα − xα =
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
.
The continuation value v1
HL is then given by
v1
HL = xα +
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
= Xα.
Consider next the value v1
LL. The binding on-IC-P1
H yields
v1











and thus xα <v 1




jk = xα = Xα.
Hence, the constraint on-IC-P1
H is binding, since v1
LL is chosen such that this constraint is
binding. On the other hand, v1
HL is chosen by adding both sides of on-IC-P1
H and on-IC-P2
H, when
each of them is binding (adding both sides of (5) in the text). Thus, if on-IC-P1
H is binding, then
on-IC-P2
H also is binding. Until now, we have seen that for {(δ,α):α ≥ α∗(δ)}, there exists a
policy vector yα that establishes the endpoint (xα,X α). Letting y0
α denote an analogous policy
vector that implements the other endpoint, the remainder of the segment can be established with
the convex combination of yα and y0
α.
33(ii) We next prove the second claim: For the parametric area Aon ≡ {(δ,α):α∗(δ) <α<1},
there exists a policy vector in which the constraint add-IC is slack. Consider a point (ˆ δ, ˆ α) ∈ Aon.
Then there exists a point (ˆ δ − ε, ˆ α) ∈ Aon for a small number ε>0. The previous result implies
that at this point, there exists a policy vector yˆ α such that the associated constraint add-IC is
binding:
Xˆ α − xˆ α =( 1− ˆ α)
µ
ρ − θH
ˆ δ − ε
¶
.
Thus, given the policy vector yˆ α, the constraint add-IC is slack for δ = ˆ δ, since






It also can be shown that continuation values v1
HL and v1
LL are drawn from the self-enforcing
segment; continuation value v1
HL is given by
v1






and thus, xˆ α <v 1
HL <X ˆ α, and it is immediate that xα <v 1
LL <X α. Lastly, for the same reason
as above, both on-IC-P1
H and on-IC-P2
H are binding. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider ﬁrst the case in which ρ ≥ CH. Finding the policy vector
that satisﬁes all the on-schedule incentive constraints is immediate from the proof of Lemma 5.
For {(δ,α):α = α∗(δ)}, the policy vector that establishes the endpoint (xα,X α) is
y∗ ≡

     



















Given this policy vector, the constraint add-IC is binding such that
d(y∗;α = α∗(δ)) =
(1 − α∗(δ))(ρ − θH)
δ
.
34In other words, given y∗,






Since the binding on-schedule incentive constraints imply that
v1






we can obtain v1
HL = Xα within the segment. From the binding on-IC-P1
H,
v1




(1 − α∗(δ))(ρ − θH)
δ
,
we also can obtain v1
LL within the segment: xα <v 1
LL <X α.
The oﬀ-schedule incentive constraints, given this policy vector y∗, are
δ(v1
LL − v) ≥ ρ − θL (oﬀ-IC-P1
LL)
δ(v1
LH − v) ≥ ρ − θL (oﬀ-IC-P1
LH)
δ(v1
HL − v) ≥ ρ − θH (oﬀ-IC-P1
HL)
δ(v1





1−δ.T h e no ﬀ-IC-P1
LH is slack and oﬀ-IC-P1
HL is implied by oﬀ-IC-P1
HH. The relevant













≥ ρ − θL
δ (xα − v) ≥ ρ − θH.









1 − µ + µ2α∗(δ)
¤
(ρ − θH)+µ2(θH − θL)
1 − δ
.
35Note that xα + Xα =
ρ−E(θ)
1−δ . Plugging xα into the two oﬀ-IC yields δ∗
LL and δ∗
HH. The critical
discount factor under the contract in which α = α∗ (δ) is δ∗ =m a x {δ∗
LL,δ∗
HH}.
Consider next the case in which ρ<C H.F o r{(δ,β):β = β∗(δ)}, deﬁne a policy vector:
y∗ ≡

     
















Given this policy vector, the constraint add-IC is binding such that
d(y∗;β = β∗(δ)) =
(1 − β∗(δ))(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
.
Thus, given the policy vector in (A11),
Xβ − xβ =
(1 − β∗(δ))(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
.
Since the binding on-schedule incentive constraints imply that
v1
HL = xβ +
(1 − β∗(δ))(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
,
we can obtain v1
HL = Xβ within the segment. The binding on-IC-P1
H gives
v1
LL = xβ +
2µ − 1+µ(1 − µ)
µ
·
(1 − β∗(δ))(ρ − θH)
δ
,
and thus xα <v 1
LL <X α. Given the policy vector,
xβ =




µβ∗(δ)(ρ − θH)+µ(θH − θL)
1 − δ
. (A13)
Hence, for β = β∗(δ), there exists the policy vector y∗ that establishes the endpoint (xβ,X β) where
xβ + Xβ =
[1−(1−µ)2](ρ−θL)
1−δ . The remainder of the self-generating segment can be implemented by
the convex combination of y∗ and y∗0 that establishes the other endpoint.




2µ − 1+µ(1 − µ)
µ
·




≥ ρ − θL (oﬀ-IC-P1
LL)
δ (xβ − v) ≥ ρ − θH. (oﬀ-IC-P1
HH)
Plugging xβ i n( A 1 2 )i n t ot h et w oc o n s t r a i n t sy i e l d sδ∗
LL and δ∗
HH respectively. The critical discount
factor is δ∗ =m a x {δ∗
LL,δ∗
HH}. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the policy vector deﬁn e di n( A 4 ) ,t h er e l e v a n to ﬀ-schedule























where xα and q1
α are given by (A5) and (A8), respectively. Both xα and q1
α rise with α ∈ [α∗(δ),1].
Plugging xα and q1
α into (A14) and (A15) yields the set of the pair (δ,α), where both oﬀ-schedule
incentive constraints are satisﬁed. Then, applying the fact that the boundary cannot be upward-
s l o p i n gt ot h i ss e to b t a i n st h es e t{(δ,α):f(δ,α) ≥ κ}. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. To construct the point (X,X), consider a symmetric policy vector:
y ≡

        




















2. If the downward incentive constraint of each ﬁrm (on-IC-Pi
H) is binding, the
policy vector gives
X =
ρ − E (θ) − (1 − α)µ(ρ − θH)+2 αµ(1 − µ)(ρ − θH)ε − 2ϕε
2(1− δ)
, (A17)
37where ϕ ≡ (1 − µ)(ρ − θH) − µ(1 − µ)(θH − θL) > 0. The continuation value vi
LL is assigned to a
lower value:
vi
LL = X −
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)(1 + 2(1 − µ)ε)
2δµ
,
so as to soften the ﬁrms’ incentive to understate costs. This implies that to elicit truthful com-
munication at the point (X,X),Xmust be greater than x at least by
(1−α)(ρ−θH)(1+2(1−µ)ε)
2δµ . To
consider the case in which add-IC is binding at (X,X), let vi
LL = x. Then at the point (X,X),
on-schedule incentive constraints are satisﬁed; vi
LL is chosen such that on-IC-Pi
H is binding, and
on-IC-Pi
L is slack by Lemma 2.
Given that the point (X,X) is constructed by the policy vector y, we next consider a policy
vector y0 to construct the other point (x,x). As in the text, the policy vector y0 thus assigns
symmetric market shares such that q1
LH = q2







where 0 ≤ ε<1
2. The on-schedule incentive constraints, on-IC-Pi
H and on-IC-Pi
L, are then given
by
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
¡
¯ qi

















L − ¯ qi
H = 1
2 − 2(2µ − 1)ε, both constraints will be satisﬁed if α is suﬃciently large or ε
is suﬃciently small. We now construct a self-generating value x. The ex ante expected payoﬀ at
(x,x) is
Ui = µUi(L,L)+( 1− µ)Ui(H,H)
= µ(ρ − θL)¯ qi
L +( 1− µ)(ρ − θH)¯ qi
H − µ(θH − θL)¯ qi
H
+δµ¯ vi
L + δ (1 − µ)¯ vi
H.
Given the policy vector, letting x = Ui obtains the value x:
x =









38where ξ ≡ µ(ρ − θL) − [(1 − µ)(ρ − θH) − µ(θH − θL)](3µ − 2) > 0. Using (A17) and (A18), the






can be rewritten as
ε =
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)(1 − δ + µ(1 + µ)δ)
2µ(ξ − ϕ)δ − 2(1 − µ)(1− α − δµ2)(ρ − θH)
,
where ξ − ϕ>0. The RHS decreases with α. Hence, if α is suﬃciently large, there exists ε (i.e.,
a policy vector) that satisﬁes all the on-schedule constraints, on-IC-Pi
H, on-IC-Pi
L and add-IC, at
both points (x,x) and (X,X).
The critical discount factor is deﬁned as δs =m a x {δx,δX}, where δx and δX are given when
the respective oﬀ-schedule constraints at (x,x) and (X,X) are binding:








, (ρ − θH)(1 − ε)
¾







In both constraints, the ﬁrst term of the RHS is what the low-cost ﬁrm could earn today in state
(L,L) by undercutting the price, and the second term is what the high-cost ﬁrm could earn today
in state (L,H) or (H,L) by undercutting the price. Lastly, if α → 1, then for δ>δ s, there exists
ε → 0 such that X →
ρ−E(θ)
2(1−δ) and X − x → 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a policy vector y∗ that implements an endpoint (xα,X α),

















Given this policy vector, the constraint add-IC is binding such that
d(y∗;α = α∗(δ)) =
(1 − α∗(δ))(ρ − θH)
δ
.
39In other words, given y∗,
Xα − xα =
(1 − α∗(δ))(ρ − θH)
δ
.
From the binding on-schedule incentive constraints,
v1
HL = xα +




HL = Xα. The binding downward on-IC-P1 yields
v1




(1 − α∗(δ))(ρ − θH)
δ
,
and thus if µ>1
3, then xα <v 1
LL <X α. Given the policy vector in (A19),
xα =
[1 + µ − µ(1 + µ)α∗ (δ)](ρ − θH)+µ(1 − µ)(θH − θL)
2(1 − δ)
Xα =
[1 − µ + µ(1 + µ)α∗ (δ)](ρ − θH)+µ(1 + µ)(θH − θL)
2(1 − δ)
.
Notice that xα + Xα =
ρ−E(θ)
1−δ and that the length of the self-generating segment equals what it
is required, i.e., Xα − xα =
(1−α∗(δ))(ρ−θH)
δ . Hence, if α = α∗(δ), there exists the policy vector y∗
that can implement the endpoint (xα,X α). The remainder of the self-generating segment can be












≥ ρ − θL (oﬀ-IC-P1
LL)





Plugging xα into the two oﬀ-schedule IC’s yields δ∗
LL and δ∗
HH respectively. The critical discount
factor is δ∗ =m a x {δ∗
LL,δ∗
HH}; thus, for δ>δ ∗, no ﬁrm will undertake an oﬀ-schedule deviation.
¥
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